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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction was originally vested in the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j), U.C.A. (1953 as amended); however, 
pursuant to the authority vested in the Utah Supreme Court 
§78-2-2(4) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) this case was transferred to 
the Court of Appeals which now has jurisdiction pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(2)(j). This is a brief in behalf of Clay S. Cutler, 
plaintiff, in support of a judgment entered below. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the court err in rendering Summary Judgment for the 
plaintiff based upon the evidence presented to the trial court? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
When the moving party has presented evidence to support a 
judgment in his favor, and the opposing party fails to submit 
contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in concluding that 
no genuine issue of fact is present or would be at trial. Arnica 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P2d 950 (Utah App. 1989); 
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P2d 624, 636-37 (Utah 1960). 
1 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Ut. R. Civ, P. 56 (Addendum J). 
8TATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered in favor 
of the Plaintiff/Appellee and against the Defendant/Appellant. 
On January 4, 1993, the court ordered that a judgment be 
entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for 
life insurance proceeds that had previously been paid to the 
defendant. R. 134. The District Court denied defendant's Motion 
to Alter or Amend Judgment on March 24, 1993, but ordered that 
paragraphs 8, 11 and 12 of the court's Findings of Fact be 
amended to conform with the court's ruling of February 18, 1993. 
R. 169. Amended Findings of Fact were entered March 24, 1993. 
R. 165. 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal 
on April 6# 1993. R. 172. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Clay S. Cutler, is the minor child of Mary 
Ellen Cutler and Marlon Cutler. On August 21, 1989, the District 
Court granted to Mary Ellen Cutler a Decree of Divorce from 
Marlon Cutler, said case being Civil No. 890000384. The Findings 
of Fact entered by the court on the same date contain the 
following: 
"(3) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that each will 
continue in force and effect any life insurance 
policies that each party currently has for the benefit 
of the minor child of the parties.11 
(Addendum B, p. 4); R. 125. 
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The Decree and Findings were based upon a Stipulation 
entered into between said parties, which Stipulation was signed 
by Mary Ellen Cutler on the 14th day of August, 1989 and by 
Marlon Cutler on the 15th day of August, 1989. This Stipulation 
contained the following: 
,f(c) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that each will 
continue in force and effect any life insurance 
policies that each party currently has for the benefit 
of the minor child of the parties." 
Addendum A, p. 3; R. 125. 
At the time the Stipulation was entered into and at the time 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree were 
entered by the court in the divorce action, Marlon S. Cutler had 
in force and effect two life insurance policies on his life, 
which policies were as follows: 
(a) Gem Insurance Company in the amount of 
$43,000.00. R. 47-49. 
(b) Provident Life and Accident Company in the 
amount of $13,758.62. R. 50-63. 
Marlon S. Cutler aka Marlon Cutler died January 11, 1992. 
R. 126. Subsequent to his death and on or about January 28, 1992 
Gem Insurance Company paid to Linda Cutler, decedent's present 
wife, the sum of $43,000.00 representing life insurance death 
benefits on the life of Marlon S. Cutler aka Marlon Cutler. R. 
126. On or about February 27, 1992 Provident Life and Accident 
Company paid to Linda Cutler, decedent's present wife, the sum of 
$13,758.62, being life insurance proceeds on the life of Marlon 
S. Cutler aka Marlon Cutler. R. 126. 
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All of the foregoing facts are undisputed and were accepted 
by the defendant in her response to plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. R. 80. 
At the hearing on plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
held October 9, 1992, the court suggested that affidavits from 
Attorney Thomas L. Willmore and Mary Ellen Cutler may be 
informative to everyone. R. 230 and R. 242. In keeping with the 
court's directions, the affidavits of Mary Ellen Cutler and 
Thomas L. Willmore were filed with the court on October 19, 1992, 
R. 98, 109 and 242. No responsive affidavit was ever filed by 
the defendant and no objections were filed to the affidavits 
prior to the court's Memorandum Decision on November 17, 1992. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court was correct in entering a Summary Judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The 
Stipulation and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered in the divorce case are the best evidence as to what the 
parties agreed upon and as to what the court found. (Addendums 
A, B). The affidavits of Mary Ellen Cutler (Addendum I) and 
Thomas L. Willmore (Addendum H) further support the correctness 
of the Stipulation and Findings entered in the divorce action. 
R. 98 and R. 109. Finally the notes of Thomas L. Willmore 
clarify any ambiguities the defendant hopes to raise. It is 
important to examine these notes as they are written: 
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1113. Life Ins. - both will maintain for ben. of 
Clay. 
- Mary Ellen's w/Thiokol 
- Marlon's w/State.M 
R. 150. (emphasis added). 
Based upon such evidence the trial court specifically found 
that the $43,000.00 policy and the $13,758.62 policy were both 
provided to Marlon through his employment by the State and were, 
therefore, the policies referred to in the divorce documents. 
R. 166. (Addendum G). 
While the plaintiff has presented evidence in support of his 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the defendant has offered nothing to 
refute any of the facts presented by the plaintiff. This was 
recognized by the District Court when it suggested that the 
defendant be given ten days to refute any testimony (or 
affidavit) presented by plaintiff. In the words of Judge Low, 
"If you can't then that fact stands", . . . "If you can come up 
with a responsive and controverting affidavit, fine. If not, I 
suspect his affidavit will carry the day and then I have to apply 
the principles of law, . . . ." R. 233 and R. 242. 
Notwithstanding these directions, the defendant failed to offer 
any refuting or controverting affidavits or other evidence. 
The defendant suggests the fact that Marlon S. Cutler 
changed the beneficiaries on his insurance to his present wife 
was evidence that he did not understand the effects of the 
divorce documents as the court has interpreted them. Plaintiff 
would suggest that it is more probable that Marlon simply chose 
to disregard the divorce documents. It is clear that under Utah 
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law the provisions of the divorce documents must be given full 
force and effect and control the disposition of the life 
insurance proceeds. 
There is no evidence that the defendant has suffered any 
manifest injustice. The defendant seeks to obtain from the 
decedent something which he did not have to give. The decedent 
had contracted away in his divorce action the benefits the 
defendant now seeks to have this court award to her. Therefore, 
since there is no manifest injustice, the trial court's actions 
should not be disturbed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE PLAINTIFF PRESENTED 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT AND THE DEFENDANT 
FAILED TO SUBMIT CONTRARY EVIDENCE. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
" . . . when a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him." 
Plaintiff has submitted the affidavits of Thomas L. Willmore and 
Mary Ellen Cutler which speak for themselves (Addendums H and I). 
Nevertheless, the defendant seeks to place the burden on the 
plaintiff of showing the decedent's intent but the defendant has 
submitted nothing but speculation and conjecture as to the 
decedent's intent. When invited by the court to submit whatever 
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refuting or controverting evidence she had, the defendant 
submitted nothing. R. 233, 242. 
The notes of Attorney Thomas L. Willmore, R. 105 (Addendum 
I, p. 8), the Stipulation entered in the divorce case, (Addendum 
A), the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in the 
divorce case, (Addendum B), the Affidavit of Mary Ellen Cutler, 
R. 98, (Addendum I), and the Affidavit of Thomas L. Willmore, R. 
109, (Addendum H) all support the judgment entered by the court. 
The two life insurance policies of Marlon Cutler that are the 
subject matter of this lawsuit were in effect at the time of the 
divorce. R. 40. Both of these policies were through the 
defendant's employment with the State of Utah. R. 166. All of 
the foregoing evidence was accepted and uncontroverted by the 
defendant. R. 80. When all of the above evidence is considered 
as a "whole" the language in the divorce documents is clear and 
the court need go no further. 
The defendant suggests that the Stipulation and Property 
Settlement Agreement is less than clear since it did not 
specifically name an insurance policy or amount of the coverage 
expected to be maintained. This is contrary to Utah law. In the 
case of Madsen v. Moffitt, 542 Pd 187 (Utah 1975), the parties to 
a divorce decree stipulated: 
"The defendant hereby stipulates and agrees to 
maintain in full force and effect the life insurance he 
presently maintains through group coverage in 
connection with his employment for the benefit of 
plaintiff and minor child, . . . " 
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The Stipulation of the parties was approved by the court in the 
Divorce Decree. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
"The decedent and his former wife in arriving at 
the property settlement agreement in the divorce 
proceedings undoubtedly dealt with the property and 
other assets of the marriage as they then existed. 
That part of the stipulation above referred to dealing 
with life insurance did not specify a particular policy 
by number nor was an amount mentioned. We assume that 
the parties knew of the insurance coverage at that time 
and had contracted in respect thereto. We also assume 
that the parties had full knowledge of the extent of 
the coverage dealt with as it then existed. We hold 
that the plaintiffs are entitled to the amount of the 
insurance as of the date of the divorce decree. The 
balance of the insurance proceeds should be awarded to 
the defendants in accordance with the terms of the 
policy." 
Madsen 542 2d at 188 (emphasis added). 
Defendant argues that since the plaintiff was only an 
alternate beneficiary at the time of the divorce, "it is arguable 
that the decedent maintained no insurance for the benefit of the 
minor child at the time of the divorce and intended only that the 
primary beneficiary use the policy proceeds for his son's support 
in the event of death." (see Brief of Appellant, page 8). There 
is absolutely no evidence of any intent that the primary 
beneficiary use the insurance for the minor's benefit.1 
The only evidence before the court establishes that what the 
parties did is that which is commonly done: provide for their 
minor child with life insurance proceeds in the event of death. 
A divorce court has the general and inherent power to require a 
1In this regard, it should be noted that the only evidence 
before the court indicates no such intent. In fact, rather than 
using the insurance proceeds for the minor child's benefit, the 
Defendant purchased a home for herself. 
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husband and father to obtain or maintain insurance on his life 
for the benefit of the children of the marriage during their 
minority. 59 ALR3d 29. Furthermore, this power is increased 
whenever the Decree is based upon a Stipulation or Property 
Settlement Agreement. 59 ALR3d 44-45. 
In the Utah case of The Travelers Insurance Company v. 
Bernice Lewis et al. 531 P2d 484 (Utah 1975) the Decree of 
Divorce contained the following provision: 
"6. The defendant is hereby ordered to maintain 
in full force and effect the $5,000.00 life insurance 
policy on the life of the defendant with the plaintiff 
as the beneficiary and the three minor children as 
contingent beneficiaries in the event the plaintiff 
remarries or dies." 
The Travelers Insurance Company. 531 P2d at 485. In that case 
both parties remarried, and Mr. Lavender (the husband and 
defendant), contrary to the divorce decree, changed the named 
beneficiary of the policy to his second wife. The court held: 
"There is ample authority to sustain the ruling of the 
trial court in holding that the provisions of a divorce 
decree control the disposition of the proceeds of an 
insurance policy between contending beneficiaries." 
Id. at 485, 486 (citations omitted). 
The defendant conjectures the fact that the decedent changed 
his beneficiaries several times after his divorce is evidence of 
an intent contrary to the plaintiff's position. 
It is noted that the defendant in the Travelers Insurance 
Company case, contrary to the decree, changed the beneficiary of 
the policy to be his second wife. This is exactly what has 
happened in the present case. Accordingly, this court should 
9 
hold, as did the Travelers Insurance Company court, that the 
provisions of a divorce decree control the disposition of the 
proceeds of an insurance policy between contending beneficiaries 
and summary judgment should be entered against the defendant. 
POINT U 
II. WHERE THE DECEDENT HAS IN A DIVORCE ACTION CONTRACTED 
TO CONTINUE IN FORCE AND EFFECT LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES 
THAT HE HAS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE MINOR CHILD HE 
CANNOT THEREAFTER DESIGNATE ANY BENEFICIARY OTHER THAN 
SAID MINOR CHILD. 
The decedent by his actions did, at the time of his divorce, 
contract away his right to name anyone other than his minor 
child, as beneficiary of any life insurance policies he had in 
effect with the State at that time. Decedent could not, with any 
legal effect, transfer to his second wife, defendant herein, what 
he no longer had. This right to transfer was gone at the time of 
decedent's divorce. See The Travelers Insurance Company, 531 P2d 
at 485, 486; and 59 ALR3d 29. 
The defendant relies upon Culbertson v. Continental 
Assurance Co.. 631 P2d 906 (Utah 1981). That case involved 
proceeds of a profit sharing plan and certain life insurance 
proceeds. It is distinguished from our present case in that the 
decedent never changed his beneficiary designations after his 
divorce and there was nothing in the Property Settlement and 
Divorce Decree that required a relinquishment or waiver of the 
spouses' rights to the profit sharing proceeds or the life 
insurance proceeds. 
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In our case there is an express provision in the divorce 
documents that is a waiver and relinquishment by the decedent of 
his right to name anyone other than the minor child as 
beneficiary of the life insurance policies in question. 
Accordingly, under our case none of the several changes of 
beneficiary designations were valid for the reason they were 
contrary to the express terms of the divorce documents. 
The defendant mentions the fact that the Decree of Divorce 
did not contain the dispositive language of paragraph 3(c) of the 
Stipulation, and that this should somehow relieve decedent of its 
binding effect. The defendant ignores the language of the 
Stipulation which provides, " . . . the parties respectfully 
request the court to approve and grant the provisions of said 
agreement and incorporate them in any Divorce Decree which may be 
issued." (Addendum A, p. 1). In light of the language of the 
Stipulation the omission from the Decree was nothing more than an 
oversight or scrivener's error. The trial court had no problem 
with the absence of such language from the Decree. 
R. 116. (Addendum D). The Stipulation alone should be sufficient 
since that was the contract which the decedent signed. 
POINT III 
III. WHERE THERE IS NO MANIFEST INJUSTICE THE APPELLATE 
COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE ACTIONS OF THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Defendant relies on the case of Jackson v. Jackson. 617 Pd 
338 (Utah 1980) to support her claim that the Appellate Court 
should substitute its own judgment where the ruling of the trial 
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court results in manifest injustice. In the Jackson case the 
court held there was no manifest injustice: 
,fIt is to be observed at the outset that this 
Court is not at liberty to undertake an independent 
retrial of all factual issues arising in a suit in 
equity. This Court is charged with the review of both 
facts and law in equity decisions, and may, where the 
occasion warrants, substitute its own judgment for that 
of the trial court and fashion its own remedy according 
to the demands of justice. Nevertheless, the trial 
court's disposition of the matter is entitled to a 
certain deference, and should be disturbed only where 
such is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. We 
are not convinced that the trial court's disposition of 
the instant matter constituted such manifest injustice 
that remedy is required at the hands of this Court." 
Jackson, 617 P2d at 340 (emphasis added). 
The defendant has not referred to any evidence of manifest 
injustice which is properly before the court.2 At the time of 
his divorce the decedent contracted to continue in force and 
effect his life insurance policies for the benefit of his minor 
child. This was clearly done prior to his marriage to the 
defendant. Therefore, defendant knew or could have determined 
this prior to her marriage to the decedent. The provisions for 
the benefit of the minor child are certainly justified. Nothing 
is taken from the defendant for the reason the decedent had 
nothing (by way of the life insurance polices in question) that 
he could give to the defendant. 
defendant acknowledges the court did not consider the 
competing equities between the parties. Neither the social 
security benefits received by the plaintiff nor the full 
retirement benefits of the decedent received by the defendant 
were considered. It was proper for the trial court not to 
consider these items since they were irrelevant and immaterial 
due to the divorce documents. 
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The plaintiff's position is consistent with Penrose v, 
Penrose, 656 P2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added) which 
held: 
"It is the duty and prerogative of this Court in 
equity matters, where the occasion warrants, and after 
a review of both the facts and the law, to fashion its 
own remedy as a substitute for the judgment of the 
trial court, but that court's actions should only be 
disturbed to prevent manifest injustice. 
Therefore, since there is no manifest injustice in our case, the 
trial court's actions should not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this 
case. The provision in the divorce documents is clear. This is 
especially true when all of the evidence is considered as a 
"whole". The lack of evidence presented by the defendant and her 
reliance upon speculation and conjecture are insufficient to 
sustain her position. The ruling of the trial court should be 
upheld. 
DATED this H day of November, 1993. 
Rfeed W. Hadfi^ld 
Attorney for/Appellee/Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foreoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were nailed, postage prepaid, to the 
attorney for the Appellant/Defendant, Christopher L. Shaw, 
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, HAMILTON & SHAW, at 635 25th Street, Ogden 
Utah 84401 this H^ day of November^ JL993,. ./ 
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ADDENDUM 
Stipulation 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Decree of Divorce 
Memorandum Decision 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Judgment and Order 
Amended Findings of Fact 
Affidavit of Thomas L. Willmore 
Affidavit of Mary Ellen Cutler aka Mary Ellen Butler 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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Tab A 
Thomas L. Willmore (#4256) 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
123 East Main Street 
P. 0. Box 115 
Tremonton, Utah 84337 
Telephone: (801) 257-3885 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
MARLON CUTLER, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION 
civi l NO. Myyu&if 
Be HOGGAN 
EYS AT LAW 
5T CENTER 
IOX S2S 
JTAM 64321 
752 1551 
TON OFFICE. 
AST MAIN 
IOX 115 
i UTAH 8 4 3 3 7 
1573885 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and the Defendant and in 
consideration of the mutual convenants and conditions herein set 
forth, the parties do stipulate, contract and agree one with the 
other as follows: 
WHEREAS, the Plaintiff has filed a Complaint for divorce; 
and 
WHEREAS, the parties are desirous of stipulating and 
agreeing each with the other concerning the property and rights 
of the parties on the issues of child custody, visitation, child 
support, medical insurance, medical expenses, life insurance, 
alimony, division of property, division of debts, retirement 
plans and attorney's fees, and the parties respectfully request 
the Court to approve and grant the provisions of said agreement 
and incorporate them in any Divorce Decree which may be issued. 
Numberg&2222& 
FiLED 
AUG 17 1989 
OLSON ft HOGGAN 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
56 WEST CENTER 
PO BOX 525 
LOGAN UTAH 64321 
(801)752 1551 
TREMONTON OFFICE. 
1 2 3 EAST MAIN 
PO BOX 1 15 
TREMONTON UTAH 6 4 3 3 7 
(801)257 3885 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereby agree with the other < 
follows: 
1. Divorce. Plaintiff shall be granted a Decree of Dive 
from the Defendant on her Complaint, said Decree to become fii 
upon signing by the Court. 
2. Custody and Visitation. During the course of their 
marriage, the parties have had two (2) children born as issue 
their marriage, namely: CLAY S. CUTLER (born 3/25/76) and MAI 
ANN CUTLER (born 10/11/69). Plaintiff and Defendant stipulate 
and agree that they shall have joint custody and control of tt 
minor child, Clay S. Cutler. The parties agree that Plaintifi 
to be the primary custodial parent with the minor child residi 
with her and Defendant is to be the secondary custodial parent 
with liberal and reasonable visitation rights. 
The parties agree that if the minor child decides he want 
to reside with Defendant, and it is in the minor child's best 
interest, and if Plaintiff, Defendant the the minor child are 
agreement, then he may reside with Defendant without this Cour 
issuing another order and Defendant's child support obligation 
shall terminate while the minor child is residing with Defenda 
However, if the minor child resumes residing with Plaintiff, t 
Defendant's child support obligation shall be reinstated as se 
forth in paragraph 3. 
3. Child Support and Insurance. 
(a) Defendant agrees to pay to Plaintiff as and for the 
support and maintenance of the minor child, the sum of $150.00 
per month until said child reaches the age of majority or 
HOGGAN 
'S AT LAW 
CENTER 
>X525 
AM 8 4 3 2 1 
\2-1551 
>N OFFICE; 
IT MAIN 
X 115 
UTAH 8 4 3 3 7 
.7 .3885 
graduates from high school, whichever is later. Said monthly 
child support payment shall be paid in equal installments to 
Plaintiff so that one-half (1/2) is paid on or before the 5th da} 
of each month and the other one-half (1/2) is paid on or before 
the 20th day of each month. Said child support payment of 
$150.00 per month is based upon Plaintiff's current monthly 
gross income of $1875.00 and Defendant's current monthly gross 
income of $1670.00. 
(b) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that both parties will 
maintain medical and dental insurance upon the minor child of 
the parties when it is available through their employment or any 
other future employment. Plaintiff and Defendant stipulate that 
each shall be equally responsible for one-half (1/2) of the 
deductible and any uncovered medical and dental expenses. 
(c) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that each will continue 
in force and effect any life insurance policies that each party 
currently has for the benefit of the minor child of the parties. 
(d) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the withholding of 
income is hereby authorized as a means of collecting child 
support pursuant to U. C. A. Section 78-45(d)-1 et seq. Such 
withholding will only occur if Defendant is delinquent in child 
support as defined in Section 78-45(d)-1(4). This provision will 
remain effective until Defendant no longer owes child support to 
Plaintiff. 
4. Real Property. Plaintiff and Defendant agree that 
during the course of their marriage they have acquired a home 
located at 607 South Tremont, Tremonton, Utah, which is more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point North 88 41' East, 4097 feet from 
Northwest corner of the Southwest quarter of Section 10f 
Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian and 
running thence South 155.3 feet, South 89 15f East 348 
feet; thence North 14 15f West 70 feet; thence North 62 
35f East 228 feet crossing river; thence South 88 41f W< 
532 feet to the point of beginning, containing 1.64 acrei 
The parties stipulate and agree that Defendant is to have the 
home as his sole and separate property. Plaintiff and Defend* 
agree that there is approximately $30,000.00 of equity in the 
home. Defendant agrees to pay to the Plaintiff one-half (1/2] 
said equity interest or $15,000.00, which shall be paid by 
Defendant to Plaintiff on or before August 1, 1992. Defendant 
not obligated to pay interest on said obligation. Defendant 
agrees to execute a Promissory Note and Trust Deed securing tl" 
payment of said amount to Plaintiff. If Defendant sells the t 
at a fair market value within three years of the date of divor 
then Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the equity from the sa 
shall be split equally between them and Defendant does not hav 
an obligation to pay the $15,000.00 as stated above. Equity f 
purposes of this document regarding the sale of the home is 
defined as the sales price minus mortgage to Fireman's Fund, 
realtor fees and closing costs. 
5. Personal Property. Except as set forth herein, the 
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(a) Plaintiff shall have the following items of personal 
property as her sole and separate property: 
love seat 
brown La-Z-Boy chair 
microwave 
floor mirror 
hanging lamp 
(upstairs) 
vacuum cleaner 
1/2 of dishes, 
pots and pans, 
towels and bedding 
wood rocking chair 
dining room set 
washer & dryer 
end tables 
lawn mower 
scanner 
wall decor and knick-knacks 
(except wood clock) 
1977 Buick Skylark 
portable T. V. 
dishwasher 
freezer 
phone seat 
gas grill 
small applianc 
(b) Defendant shall have the following items of personal 
property as his sole and separate property: 
Refrigerator Bedroom set 
La-Z-Boy chair Console T. V, 
Front room wall mirror wood clock 
barn scene 
saws (chain) 
1/2 of dishes, 
pots and pans, 
entry walls 
hanging lamp 
(downstairs) 
1979 Chevrolet truck 
towels and bedding hand tools 
couch 
VCR 
cowboy picture 
lawn mower 
camping gear 
horse trailer 
power tools 
saddles 
horse tack one horse 
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(c) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the 1988 Prowler 18 
foot travel trailer be sold or refinanced by Defendant to remove 
Plaintiff's obligation therefrom. If the trailer is sold, 
Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the proceeds from the sale 
are to be applied to the loan obligation for the trailer. 
6. Payment of Debts and Obligations. Plaintiff agrees to 
pay the following debts and obligations and to indemnify and hole 
Defendant harmless therefrom: Visaf Discovery Card, Bon Marche, 
G.E.C.A.F.f Weinstocks, vacuum cleaner purchase, First Security 
Bankf and any and all debts and obligations incurred 
individually by her since the date of separation on or about July 
1, 1989. 
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Defendant agrees to pay the following debts and obligatit 
and to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom: 
Fireman's Fund house mortgage (approximately $38f500.00), casl 
reserve with First Security Bank, Visa, Quick-Line First 
Security, Greentree Financing and Bank One, and any and all de 
and obligations incurred individually by him since the date oi 
separation on or about July 1, 1989. 
7. Retirement or Pension Funds. The parties acknowledge 
that Plaintiff has a retirement or pension fund through her 
employment with Thiokol Corporation and that Defendant has a 
retirement or pension fund through his employment with Utah St 
Retirement. The parties stipulate and agree that each party si 
have his or her retirement or pension fund as his or her sole 
separate property and that neither party shall claim any intei 
in the other party's pension or retirement fund. Each party 
forever waives any claim to either party's pension or retireme 
funds. 
8. Preparation of Documents. It is expressly understood 
between the parties that this Stipulation has been prepared b^ 
Plaintiff's attorney who is Thomas L. Willmore. Defendant 
acknowledges that Plaintiff's attorney has explained to him hi 
right to retain independent legal counsel or such other advice 
he may deem in his best interest to review the Stipulation and 
the terms, provisions and conditions thereof and that this 
Stipulation is entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant af 
having received such advice and counsel and after having made 
such examination as he deems in his best interest. 
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9. Attorney's Fees and Costs of Court, The parties 
stipulate and agree that each shall be responsible for the 
attorney's fees and costs of Court that each has incurred in th 
matter, if this divorce is obtained upon this Stipulation. 
Should a default arise under this Stipulation and its terms, th 
Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the party creating the defau 
agrees to pay all costs and reasonable attorney's fees to resol 
the dispute or enforce the terms and conditions of this 
Stipulation. 
10. Duty to Cooperate. Both parties agree to execute and 
deliver to the other party, within thirty days of the date of 
entry of the Divorce Decree, if anyr any and all documents and 
other property necessary to effect the intent of this 
Stipulation. 
11. Voluntary Contract. Plaintiff and Defendant 
acknowledge that they execute this Stipulation of their own free 
will and choice, believing it to be in their best interest and 
the best interest of the parties' minor child. 
12. Disclosure. Each of the parties acknowledge that a 
full and complete disclosure of all property and debts incurred 
or acquired during their marriage has been made and should other 
assets or debts later be discoveredf an equitable order would 
have to be entered at such time. 
13. Waiver. Defendantf by his signature, hereby enters hi 
appearance in this matter and specifically waives any further 
notice of the proceedings herein, and does hereby consent that 
Plaintiff may take judgment for divorce as prayed for in her 
Complaint, provided the provisions of said Decree correspond 
the provisions of this Settlement Agreement. 
DATED this H™ day of $rfy? 1989. 
Mary Mien Cutler 
DATED this IS' day of SrPf, 1989. 
.^ yL /^_ \ ^^u^, m Marlon Cutler 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Box Elder ) ss, 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by MARY ELLEN CUTLER, 
Plaintiff, this & day of **%, 1989. 
tiht, ?]hA1foar^ 
CARY PUBLtfC , . 
l e s id ing atiJfyWnCJljVp U7*-A-
Commission Expires : / l / ^ ' i / * ? ^ 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Box Elder ) ss. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by MARLON CUTLER, the 
Defendant, this l^~* day of 1989. 
igUooo: 
NOTARY PUBLt& 
Residing at:-treJTU?nfP1, U."t~ 
Commission Expires : [i-zz-9d 
TabB 
Thomas L. Wnlmore 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
123 East Main Street 
P. 0. Box 115 
Tremonton, Utah 84337 
Telephone: 257-3885 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THI 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
MARLON CUTLER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. <tffrV^<$4 
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This matter came on for hearing at 1 o'clock p.m. on Mond 
August 21, 1989f in the Court Room in the Hall of Justice at 
Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah, the Honorable F. L. Gunm 
presiding. The Plaintiff was present in person and was 
represented by her Attorneys, Olson & Hoggan, Thomas L. Willmoi 
The Defendant was not present in person and was not representee 
by counsel. Plaintiff was sworn and testified, and the Court 
having heard the testimony, and having received a Stipulation c 
the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes 
and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is an actual bona fide resident of Box Elde 
County, Utah, and has been for more than three (3) months 
immediately prior to the filing of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, having 
been married to each other in Malad, Oneida County, Idaho on Mai 
^6sr/Y Q^ 
16, 1967. 
3. During the course of the marriage, substantial 
irreconcilable differences have arisen between Plaintiff anc 
Defendant. 
4. Two (2) children have been born as issue of said 
marriage, namely: CLAY S. CUTLER (born 3/25/76) and MARDI M 
CUTLER (born 10/11/69). Plaintiff and Defendant stipulate a 
ageree that they shall have joint custody and control of the 
minor child, CLAY S. CUTLER as set forth in the Stipulation 
the parties. 
5. Defendant is able bodied and gainfully employed an 
should be required to support said minor child of the partie 
6. The parties have entered into a written Stipulatic 
which the Court finds reasonable and adopts the same as foil 
a. Waiver; Defendant herewith acknowledges receipt of 
copy of the Complaint and Summons and herewith waives his ri 
to answer or otherwise plead and consents that the Plaintiff 
proceed at any time without notice to the Defendant to secur 
judgment and Decree of Divorce. Provided, however, this 
Stipulation is incorporated in any judgment or decree as may 
rendered by the Court. 
b. Custody and Visitation; During the course of thei. 
marriage, the parties have had two (2) children born as issui 
,-CGGAN their marriage, namely: CLAY S. CUTLER (born 3/25/76) and VL 
..sas" ANN CUTLER (born 10/11/69). Plaintiff and Defendant stipula-
-i*. e4321 
~"
2,551
 and agree that they shall have joint custody and control of 1 
[^-Z"CZ minor child, Clay S. Cutler. The parties agree that Plainti: 
j* * 1 5 
• -•^ 3^37 to be the primary custodial parent with the minor child resic 
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with liberal and reasonable visitation rights. 
The parties agree that if the minor child decides he want, 
to reside with Defendant, and it is in the minor child's best 
interest, and if Plaintiff, Defendant the the minor child are ; 
agreement, then he may reside with Defendant without this Court 
issuing another order and Defendants child support obligation 
shall terminate while the minor child is residing with Defendar 
However, if the minor child resumes residing with Plaintiff, tt 
Defendant's child support obligation shall be reinstated as set 
forth in paragraph 3 of the Stipulation. 
c. Child Support and Insurance. 
(1) Defendant agrees to pay to Plaintiff as and for the 
support and maintenance of the minor child, the sum of $150.00 
per month until said child reaches the age of majority or 
graduates from high school, whichever is later. Said monthly 
child support payment shall be paid in equal installments to 
Plaintiff so that one-half (1/2) is paid on or before the 5th d 
of each month and the other one-half (1/2) is paid on or before 
the 20th day of each month. Said child support payment of 
$150.00 per month is based upon Plaintiff's current monthly 
gross income of $1875.00 and Defendant's current monthly gross 
income of $1670.00. 
(2) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that both parties will 
maintain medical and dental insurance upon the minor child of 
the parties when it is available through their employment or an^ 
other future employment. Plaintiff and Defendant stipulate that 
each shall be equally responsible for one-half (1/2) of the 
deductible and any uncovered medical and dental expenses. 
(3) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that each will cont: 
in force and effect any life insurance policies that each p< 
currently has for the benefit of the minor child of the part 
(4) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the withholding 
income is hereby authorized as a means of collecting child 
support pursuant to U. C. A. Section 78-45(d)-1 et seq. Sue 
withholding will only occur if Defendant is delinquent in ch 
support as defined in Section 78-45(d)-1(4). This provision 
remain effective until Defendant no longer owes child suppor 
Plaintiff. 
d. Real Property. Plaintiff and Defendant agree that 
during the course of tjhejx marriage they have acquired a hom< 
located at 607 South Tremont, Tremontonf Utah, which is more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point North 88 41 f East, 4097 feet from 
Northwest corner of the Southwest quarter of Section 10, 
Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian and 
running thence South 155.3 feet, South 89 15f East 348 
feet; thence North 14 15f West 70 feet; thence North 62 
35f East 228 feet crossing river; thence South 88 41' W 
532 feet to the point of beginning, containing 1.64 acre 
The parties stipulate and agree that Defendant is to have the 
home as his sole and separate property. Plaintiff and Defend 
agree that there is approximately $30,000.00 of equity in the 
home. Defendant agrees to pay to the Plaintiff one-half (1/2 
said equity interest or $15,000.00, which shall be paid by 
-CGGAN Defendant to Plaintiff on or before August 1, 1992. Defendan* 
'"ZNTER 
:xs25 not obligated to pay interest on said obligation. Defendant 
•AM 84321 
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shall be split equally between them and Defendant does not ha^  
an obligation to pay the $15f000.00 as stated above. Equity i 
purposes of this document regarding the sale of the home is 
defined as the sales price minus mortgage to Fireman's Fund, 
realtor fees and closing costs. 
e. Personal Property. Except as set forth hereinf the 
parties have effected to their mutual satisfaction a division 
all other personal property in which they had an interest, eit 
singularly or jointly. 
(1) Plaintiff shall have the following items of personal 
property as her sole and separate property: 
love seat wood rocking chair 
brown La-Z-Boy chair dining room set 
microwave washer & dryer 
floor mirror end tables 
hanging lamp lawn mower 
(upstairs) scanner 
portable T. 
dishwasher 
freezer 
phone seat 
gas grill 
small applia 
vacuum cleaner wall decor and knick-knacks 
1/2 of dishes, (except wood clock) 
pots and pans, 1977 Buick Skylark 
towels and bedding 
(2) Defendant shall have the following items of personal 
property as his sole and separate property: 
Refrigerator Bedroom set 
La-Z-Boy chair Console T. V. 
Front room wall mirror wood clock 
barn scene entry walls 
saws (chain) hanging lamp 
1/2 of dishes, (downstairs) 
pots and pans, 1979 Chevrolet truck 
towels and bedding hand tools 
horse tack one horse 
couch 
VCR 
cowboy pictu. 
lawn mower 
camping gear 
horse traile: 
power tools 
saddles 
(3) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the 1988 Prowler 
foot travel trailer is to be sold or refinanced by Defendant tc 
remove Plaintiff's obligation therefrom. If the trailer is sol 
Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the proceeds from the sale a 
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to be applied to the loan obligation for the trailer. 
f. Payment of Debts and Obligations., Plaintiff agrees 
pay the following debts and obligations and to indemnify and 
Defendant harmless therefrom: Visa, Discovery Cardf Bon Mar 
G.E.C.A.F., Weinstocks, vacuum cleaner purchase, First Secur 
Bank, and any and all debts and obligations incurred 
individually by her since the date of separation on or about 
1, 1989. 
Defendant agrees to pay the following debts and obligat. 
and to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom: 
Fireman's Fund house mortgage (approximately $38,500.00), ca: 
reserve with First Security Bank, Visa, Quick-Line First 
Security, Greentree Financing and Bank One, and any and all c 
and obligations incurred individually by him since the date c 
separation on or about July 1, 1989. 
g. Retirement or Pension Funds. The parties acknowledg 
that Plaintiff has a retirement or pension fund through her 
employment with Thiokol Corporation and that Defendant has a 
retirement or pension fund through his employment with Utah S 
Retirement. The parties stipulate and agree that each party s 
have his or her retirement or pension fund as his or her sole 
separate property and that neither party shall claim any inte 
in the other party's pension or retirement fund. Each party 
forever waives any claim to either party's pension or retirem 
funds. 
h. Attorney's Fees and Costs of Court. The parties 
stipulate and agree that each shall be responsible for the 
attorney's fees and costs of Court that each has incurred in 1 
matter, if this divorce is obtained uoon this ST-ST™I »«H nn 
Should a default arise under this Stipulation and its terms, 1 
Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the party creating the def; 
agrees to pay all costs and reasonable attorney's fees to resc 
the dispute or enforce the terms and conditions of this 
Stipulation. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff and Defendant should be awarded 
joint care, custody and control of the minor child of the 
parties. 
2. There is no hope of reconciliation and a decree 
should enter awarding Plaintiff a divorce from Defendant, to 
become final upon its signing and entry by the Court. 
3. That a Decree should enter incorporating the 
Stipulation and Waiver as set forth above. 
DONE in open Court the 21st day of August, 1989. 
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n n mt rl f & 
>urt Jua 
iS 
Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law upon the Defendant by mailing a tru 
and correct copy thereof, postage prepaid in Tremontonf Otahr t 
Defendant, Marlon Cutler at 607 South Tremont, Tremontonf Utah 
84337, this A I day of August, 1989. 
\ 
retary ( ~ 
cutler.fof/T1 
TabC 
Thomas L. Willmore (#4256) 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
123 East Main 
P. 0. Box 115 
Tremonton, Utah 8433 7 
Telephone: 257-3885 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
MARLON CUTLER, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. gfe&Zgl1/ 
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This matter came on for hearing at 1 o'clock p.m. on August 
21, 1989, in the Court Room in the Hall of Justice at Brigham 
City, Box Elder County, Utah, the Honorable F.L. Gunnel1 
presiding. The Plaintiff was present in person and was 
represented by her Attorney, Thomas L. Willmore, of the Law Firm 
of OLSON & HOGGAN. The Defendant was not present in person and 
was not represented by counsel. Plaintiff was sworn and 
testified, and the Court having heard the testimony, and being 
fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, MARY ELLEN CUTLER, is hereby awarded a 
Decree of Divorce from Defendant, MARLON CUTLER, the same to 
become final and absolute the date of entry hereof. 
2. The Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby awarded the joint 
<^tccco^^ 
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care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties, 
namely: CLAY S. CUTLER, (born 3/25/76). Plaintiff is awarded 
the primary custody of the minor child residing with her and 
Defendant is awarded the secondary custody of the minor child 
with liberal and reasonable visitation rights. 
3. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to the Plaintiff a 
and for child support the sum of $150 per month for the minor 
child commencing September 1, 1989, and payable one-half (1/2) 
or before the 5th of each month and the other half on or before 
the 20th of each month. 
4. It is hereby ordered that the parties home located at 
607 South Tremont, Tremonton, Box Elder County, Utah, which is 
more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point North 88 41 ' East, 4097 feet from th< 
Northwest corner of the Southwest quarter of Section 10, 
Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian and 
running thence South 155.3 feet, South 89 15' East 348 
feet; thence North 14 15f West 70 feet; thence North 62 
35f East 228 feet crossing river; thence South 88 41' Wes-
532 feet to the point of beginning, containing 1.64 acres. 
shall awarded to Defendant subject to a $15,000.00 lien to 
Plaintiff. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff her equity 
interest of $15,000.00 on or before August 1, 1992. If Defendai 
sells the home at a fair market value within three (3) years of 
the date of divorce, then the equity is ordered to be divided 
equally between Plaintiff and Defendant. Equity is defined as 
the sales price minus mortgage to Fireman's Fund, realtor fees 
and closing costs. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the personal property now i 
her possession, love seat, brown La-Z-Boy chair, microwave, floe 
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mirror, hanging lamp (upstairs), vacuum cleaner, 1/2 of dishes, 
pots and pans and towels and bedding, wood rocking chair, dining 
room set, washer & dryer, end tables, lawn mower, scanner, wall 
decor and knick-knacks (except wood clock) 1977 Buick Skylark, 
portable T.V., dishwasher, freezer, phone seat, gas grill, small 
appliances, together with all personal property and personal 
effects which she owned prior to marriage. 
6. Defendant is hereby awarded the personal property now ii 
his possession, refrigerator, La-Z-Boy chair, front room wall 
mirror, barn scene, saws (chain) 1/2 of dishes, pots and panss, 
and towels and bedding, horse tack, bedroom set, console T.V., 
wood clock, entry walls; hanging lamp (downstairs), 1979 
Chevrolet truck, hand tools, one horse, couch, VCR, cowboy 
pictures, lawn mower, camping gear, horse trailer, power tools, 
saddles, together with all personal property and personal effects 
which he owned prior to marriage. 
7. Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby ordered to maintain 
health and dental insurance upon the minor child of the parties 
through their employment or any other future employment. 
Plaintiff and Defendant shall equally be responsible for the 
deductible and any uncovered medical expenses. 
8. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to assume and pay the 
following debts and obligations and shall indemnify and hold 
Defendant harmless therefrom: Visa, Discovery Card, Bon Marche, 
G.E.C.A.F., Weinstocks, vacuum cleaner purchase, First Security 
Bank and all debts and obligations incurred individually by her 
since the date of separation. 
9. Defendant is hereby ordered to assume and pay the 
following debts and obligations and shall indemnify and hold 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom: Fireman's Fund house mortgage 
(approximately $38,500.00), cash reserve with First Security 
Bankf Visa, Quick-Line First Security, Greentree Financing and 
Bank Onef and all debts and obligations incurred individually b 
him since the date of separation. 
10. It is hereby ordered that neither Plaintiff nor 
Defendant shall have any right or claim for alimony from the 
other, because each has waived any rights because of their 
ability to provide income for themselves. 
11. Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby awarded their own 
pension or retirement fund that each has acquired with their 
employer, and each party has waived any claim that they 
may have in the other parties' pension or retirement fund. 
12. Each party is hereby ordered to be responsible for an: 
attorney's fees that each has incurred in this matter. 
13. Each party is hereby ordered to immediately execute ai 
deliver one to the other all documents and property necessary tc 
effectuate this Decree of Divorce. 
1LSON & HOGGAN 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
56 WEST CENTER 
PO BOX 525 
.OGAN, UTAH 84321 
(SO 1)752-1551 
7REMONTON OFFICE: 
1 23 EAST MAIN 
P O. BOX 1 1 5 
'REVONTON. UTAH 8433"7 
(801)257-3885 
DATED this ^ j day of August, 1989, 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judg 
TON OFFICE. 
AST MAIN 
IOX 1 1 5 
I. UTAH 6 4 3 3 7 
' 57 -3885 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Decree of 
Divorce upon the Defendant by mailing a true and correct copy 
thereof, postage prepaid in Tremonton, Utah, to the Defendant, 
Marlon Cutler, 607 South Tremont, Tremonton, 84337, this 
o?/ - day of August, 1989. 
Secretary / nr-\ 
ft HOGGAN 
EYS AT LAW 
5T CENTER 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAY S. CUTLER, by and through 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, his 
guardian, 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
LINDA CUTLER, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 920000013 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE the Court on a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Most of the issues addressed, in the respective 
parties' memoranda, were addressed in detail in court on a 
hearing conducted the 9th day of October, 1992. 
At that hearing both parties submitted, by proffer and 
argument, the facts of the case and both admitted that the 
Court would not benefit by further testimony. In addition, the 
Defendant, in her Responsive Memorandum, accepts the facts as 
stated in the Plaintiff's Memorandum. 
This becomes pertinent in any Motion for Summary Judgment, 
but in particular here because the Court is called upon to 
interpret and apply certain language found in the Stipulation 
and Findings. The Defendant has argued that because of 
ambiguities, all the facts must be considered in that 
construction. The Court will operate on the premises that all 
M I C R O F I L M E D 
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Case No. ^^OOO^ 
Cutler vs. Cutler 
#920000013 
Page 2 
pertinent facts are before it now and that a full trial would 
not enlighten the Court further thereon. 
Of some interest is that the operative provisions in the 
Stipulation relative to the insurance benefits were found 
likewise in the Findings, but, apparently through oversight 
omitted, from the Decree. The Defendant has argued that the 
Deceased was not therefore bound thereby or at the least he may 
not have been aware of the language as people would ordinarily 
only review the Decree of Divorce and not the Findings. The 
Affidavit of Mr. Thomas L. Willmore indicates that the Deceased 
read and discussed the contents, terms and provisions of not 
only the Stipulation but likewise the Findings. As to that 
aspect/ this Court holds that the Deceased was bound by the 
terms and provisions of the Stipulation, which he obviously 
read and signed and by the Findings just as if the provisions 
were found in the Decree. 
Of other minor concern is with respect to the knowledge, if 
any, by the Defendant of the restriction on the Deceased 
relative to his handling of the insurance policies and the 
named beneficiaries. The proffer was made that she was unaware 
of the restriction. 
The rights of the Defendant cannot be enlarged by the fact 
of her marriage, nor her understanding or lack of understanding 
Cutler vs. Cutler 
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with respect to the restrictions and provisions in the 
Stipulation and Decree of Divorce. There could be some 
argument made that since she was married to the Deceased at the 
time of his death and that equity should work in her favor and 
that the Court should find her to be the lawful beneficiary of 
the policies. This case concerns both contract law and 
equity. Contract in the Stipulation and between the Deceased 
and the Plaintiff1s guardian and contract between Deceased and 
the insurance companies. Equity, of course, comes in to play 
with respect to the Divorce Decree in its entirety, the 
application of fairness with respect to the treatment of the 
language in the Stipulation and Findings and its effect upon 
the child, together with the claims by the Defendant for equity 
relative to her relationship to the Deceased. Moreover, it is 
equity which the Plaintiff seeks in having the funds taken from 
the Defendant and provided for the minor child. 
The language of the Stipulation and Findings may be argued 
to be less than entirely clear, in that it could be interpreted 
to mean that the parties will agree to continue in force and 
effect any life insurance policies which each party then had 
for the benefit of the minor child of the parties. The 
question then being whether that means that the policies if any 
would continue in force as they then were, where the minor 
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child or children was then named beneficiarys or whether the 
policies that existed were to remain in effect, not as they 
perhaps then existed/ but in the future for the benefit of the 
minor parties necessitating a change in the named beneficiary 
of the policies. 
The notes of Attorney Willmore indicate that the only 
policy referred to was that provided by the State [the Gem 
State Insurance Policy] of $43,000.00. The Provident Life and 
Accident Policy may or may not have been included/ but was not 
mentioned in the notes. The facts however are that apparently 
at the time of the Decree/ the named beneficiary was the 
Plaintiff's guardian# with the children being the contingent 
beneficiaries. The intent seems to be clear that the parties 
intended/ subsequent to the Decree, that only the minor child 
of the parties be named beneficiary. As clear as that may be# 
there are other matters less so. One question which may arise 
is what is to be done pursuant to the Stipulation once the 
minor child reaches the age of majority. Nothing in the 
Stipulation provides guidance, but it could perhaps be argued 
that once the minor child reaches the age of majority, the 
restriction on the Deceased's right to change beneficiaries is 
then lifted. 
A few months after the Decree was entered and not entirely 
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consistent with the Decree/ the named beneficiary was changed 
from the Plaintiff's guardian to the two (2) children of the 
parties, one being an adult. Later and subsequent to the 
Deceased's remarriage to the Defendant/ the adult child was 
deleted and the Defendant and the minor child were named. The 
Defendant has argued that since the Deceased first named both 
children as beneficiaries/ he obviously did not understand the 
terms and provisions of the Stipulation. After the remarriage, 
the deletion of the adult child would indicate however to the 
contrary. 
Some argument was made of the fact that at the time of the 
divorce there was a policy providing coverage on the life of 
the minor child. The Court finds that to be irrelevant/ as 
that is of no benefit to the minor child/ but likely for the 
benefit of the parents only. 
This Court's task then is to determine what was meant and 
understood by the parties and then what powers in law and/or 
equity should be exercised to enforce those intentions. In 
that regard the Court finds that the fact that the Deceased was 
not represented by counsel/ has no relevance/ as he was 
considered to be competent and able to understand the 
Stipulation into which he entered. The notes of Attorney 
Willmore and his Affidavit would confirm the same. Further# 
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paragraph 8 of the Stipulation is dispositive. 
As to the lack of specificity in the Stipulation and in the 
Findings raising a question as to whether or not the policy was 
then in force or actually what was being referred to in the 
language, the Court presumes that the parties knew and 
understood what policies of insurance they had and intended to 
continue in the future for the benefit of the minor child. 
The suggestion that the policies constituted the extent of 
the ,,estateH of the Deceased is not only inaccurate, [as they 
were not part of the "estate"], but irrelevant. Likewise that 
the receipt by the child of social security benefits has no 
relevance, nor is there any indication that the insurance was 
to provide for the minor child only in lieu of child support• 
That was however, likely part of the thinking of the parties, 
but it does not change or affect the decision of the Court. 
Although the Court is not insensitive to the concerns of 
the Defendant, and the hardship caused by the loss of the 
insurance benefits, the Court must, by equity, do what should 
have been done. After considering the various factors in this 
case and for the reasons set forth in the Plaintiff's 
Memorandum is Support of the Motions for Summary Judgment, the 
Supplemental Memorandum, together with Affidavits is support 
thereof and for the reasons set forth hereinabove, the Motion 
Cutler vs. Cutler 
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for Summary Judgment is granted in the favor of the Plaintiff. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare a formal 
Judgment and Order in conformance herewith* 
Dated this 17th day of November, 1992. 
BY THE COURT , ^ " ^ ^ 1 " ^ 
TabE 
Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #1289 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAY S. CUTLER by and 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, his 
Guardian, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LINDA CUTLER, 
Defendant. 
through 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I Civil No. 920000013CV 
This matter having come on regularly for oral arguments 
before the above-entitled court on the 9th day of October, 1992 
before the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Judge, pursuant to a 
Motion for Summary Judgment having been filed by the plaintiff; 
each of the parties having been given the opportunity to submit 
memoranda and authorities in support of their position and the 
Judge of said court, after taking said matter under advisement, 
has made and entered his written Memorandum Decision granting the 
plaintifffs Motion for Summary Judgment and pursuant thereto the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law constituting 
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the decision of the court are hereby made and entered on Motion 
of Reed W. Hadfield, attorney for the plaintiff: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The plaintiff, Clay S. Cutler, is the minor child of 
Mary Ellen Cutler and Marlon Cutler. On August 21, 1989 the 
above-entitled court granted to Mary Ellen Cutler a Decree of 
Divorce from Marlon Cutler, said case being Civil No. 890000384. 
The Findings of Fact entered by the court on the same date 
contain the following: 
"(3) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that each will 
continue in force and effect any life insurance 
policies that each party currently has for the benefit 
of the minor child of the parties." 
2. The Decree and Findings were based upon a Stipulation 
entered into between said parties, which Stipulation was signed 
by Mary Ellen Cutler dated the 14th day of August, 1989 and by 
Marlon Cutler dated the 15th day of August, 1989 and which 
Stipulation contained the following: 
H(c) Plaintiff and Defendant agree that each will 
continue in force and effect any life insurance 
policies that each party currently has for the benefit 
of the minor child of the parties." 
3. During the month of August, 1989 at the time the 
Stipulation was entered into and at the time the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree were entered by the court, 
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Marlon S. Cutler had in effect two life insurance policies on his 
life, which policies were as follows: 
(a) Gem Insurance Company in the amount of 
$43,000.00 (see copy of letter from Utah Retirement 
Systems - R. Scott Hansen dated June 17, 1992, attached 
to plaintiff1s Memorandum as Exhibit 1). 
(b) Provident Life and Accident Company in the 
amount of $13,758.62 (see copies of letters from Utah 
Retirement System - Sherrie Archibald attached to 
plaintifffs Memorandum as Exhibit 2). 
4. Marlon S. Cutler aka Marlon Cutler died January 11, 
1992. 
5. On or about January 28, 1992 Gem Insurance Company paid 
to Linda Cutler, deceasedfs present wife, the sum of $43,000.00 
representing life insurance death benefits on the life of Marlon 
S. Cutler aka Marlon Cutler (see defendant's Answers to 
plaintifffs Interrogatories). 
6. On or about February 27, 1992 Provident Life and 
Accident Company paid to Linda Cutler, deceasedfs present wife, 
the sum of $13,758.62, being life insurance proceeds on the life 
of Marlon S. Cutler aka Marlon Cutler (see defendant's Answers to 
plaintiff's Interrogatories). 
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7. On the 28th day of February 1992 the above-entitled 
court entered an Order on Order to Show Cause which provided in 
effect, as follows: 
(a) That the $43,0000.00 that was the life 
insurance proceeds received from Gem Insurance Company 
had been invested in a home to the extent of 
$41,424.25, which home is described as: 
Lot 3, Block 9, Plat A, Tremonton Townsite Survey. 
The balance of said insurance proceeds had been used to 
pay the funeral and burial expenses of Marlon S. Cutler 
aka Marlon Cutler. That the home and real property was 
placed in a constructive trust in accordance with the 
provisions of said Order. 
(b) Any additional life insurance proceeds that 
were received on the life of Marlon S. Cutler aka 
Marlon Cutler were to be placed in an interest bearing 
bank account and to be held in a constructive trust and 
not to be withdrawn except upon further Order of the 
court. 
(c) That the sum of $13,758.62 received from 
Provident Life and Accident Company has been placed in 
an interest bearing account at First Security Bank in 
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accordance with the court Order (see defendant's 
Answers to plaintiff's Interrogatories). 
8. The Affidavit of Mr. Thomas L. Willmore indicates that 
the deceased read and discussed the contents, terms and 
provisions of not only the Stipulation but likewise the Findings. 
As to that aspect the court finds that the deceased was bound by 
the terms and provisions of the Stipulation which he obviously 
read and signed and by the Findings just as if the provisions 
were found in the Decree. 
9. The court finds that whether the defendant was aware or 
was unaware of the restrictions found in the Stipulation and 
Findings of the divorce is of no consequence. The rights of the 
defendant cannot be enlarged by the fact of her marriage, nor her 
understanding or lack of understanding with respect to the 
restrictions and provisions in the Stipulation and Decree of 
Divorce. 
10. The court finds that this case concerns both contract 
law and equity. 
11. The notes of Attorney Willmore indicate that the only 
policy referred to was that provided by the state (the Gem State 
insurance policy) of $43,000.00. The Provident Life and Accident 
policy may or may not have been included, but was not mentioned 
in the notes. The facts are, however, that apparently at the 
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time of the Decree the named beneficiary was the plaintifffs 
guardian with the children being the contingent beneficiaries. 
The intent seems to be clear that the parties intended subsequent 
to the Decree that only the minor child of the parties be named 
beneficiary. 
12. The court finds that a few months after the Decree was 
entered and not entirely consistent with the Decree the named 
beneficiary was changed from the plaintiff*s guardian to the two 
(2) children of the parties, one being an adult. Later and 
subsequent to deceasedfs marriage to the defendant the adult 
child was deleted and the defendant and the minor child were 
named. The court finds that since the deceased first named both 
children as beneficiaries, and that after his remarriage he 
deleted the adult child, that this indicates that the deceased 
did understand the terms and provisions of the Stipulation. 
13. The court finds that whether or not there was a policy 
providing coverage on the life of the minor child is irrelevant 
as that is of no benefit to the minor child but likely for the 
benefit of the parents only. 
14. The court finds that the fact that the deceased was not 
represented by counsel has no relevance as he was considered to 
be competent and able to understand the Stipulation into which he 
entered. The notes of Attorney Willmore and his Affidavit would 
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confirm the same. Further, paragraph 8 of the Stipulation is 
dispositive. 
15. The court finds that the parties knew and understood 
what policies of insurance they had and intended to continue in 
the future for the benefit of the minor child. 
16. The court finds that the insurance policies were not a 
part of the estate of the deceased. 
17. The court finds that the receipt by the child of social 
security benefits has no relevance, nor is there any indication 
that the insurance was to provide for the minor child only in 
lieu of child support. 
18. The court finds after considering the various factors 
in this case for the reasons set forth in the plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Supplemental Memorandumf together with Affidavits in support 
thereof, and for the reason set forth in the court's Memorandum 
Decision, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in favor of 
the plaintiff. 
19. That there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 
AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FOREGOING FACTS THE COURT 
FINDS: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. That a judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant for the life insurance proceeds that have 
previously been paid to the defendant on the life of Marlon 
Cutler, which life insurance proceeds are as follows: 
(a) Gem Insurance Company in the amount of $43,000.00. 
(b) Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company in 
the amount of $13,758.62. 
2. The life insurance proceeds that have been placed in an 
interest bearing bank account and are being held in a 
constructive trust and not to be withdrawn except upon further 
order of this court are hereby ordered to be delivered to the 
plaintiff immediately and said amount to be applied to the above 
judgment. 
3. That the home and real property that has been acquired 
by the defendant and which is located in Box Elder County, Utah 
and more particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
Lot 3, Block 9, Plat A, Tremonton Townsite Survey. 
Together with all rights belonging thereto, 
which is being held in a constructive trust pursuant to an Order 
on Order to Show Cause on the express conditions that the home is 
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to remain free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and no 
lien or encumbrance is to be placed upon said property until the 
further Order of this court, shall remain in said constructive 
trust and the express conditions contained therein that the home 
remain free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and no lien 
or encumbrance be placed against said property, are to continue 
in full force and effect. The defendant is given ten (10) days 
from the entry of judgment within which to pay the entire 
proceeds of $43,000.00 to the plaintiff. In the event said sum 
is not paid within said ten day period, the plaintiff shall be 
entitled to either obtain an Execution or to proceed without an 
Execution to have said home sold, with the defendant to execute 
the necessary documents to complete the sale and the proceeds of 
sale shall be applied to the judgment hereinabove set forth. 
4. That interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum 
shall be paid on said insurance proceeds from the date said 
insurance proceeds were received by the defendant (which dates 
would have been on or about January 28, 1992, on the $43,000.00 
and on or about February 27, 1992, on the $13,758.62) until date 
of judgment and at the rate of twelve (12%) percent per annum 
from date of judgment until paid. 
Let judgment be entered accordingly. 
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DATED this ^/ day of paefember, 1992> 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law this JJ day 
of December, 1992, to the defendant's attorney, Quinn D. 
Hunsaker, Molgard and Hunsaker, 102 South 1st West, P. O. Box 
461, Brigham City, Utah 84302 and to Linda Cutler, 40 East 100 
North, Tremonton, Utah 84337 (Attorney Quinn Hunsaker having 
filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel dated December 8, 1992). 
SECRETARY7/ 
tr/1:cutler.fnd 
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Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thome #1289 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAY S. CUTLER by and through 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, his 
Guardian, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
LINDA CUTLER, ] 
Defendant. 
) JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
• Civil No. 920000013CV 
This matter having come on regularly for oral argument 
before the above-entitled court on the 9th day of October, 1992 
before the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Judge, pursuant to a 
Motion for Summary Judgment having been filed by the plaintiff; 
each of the parties having been given the opportunity to submit 
memoranda and authorities in support of their position and the 
Judge of said court, after taking said matter under advisement, 
has made and entered his written Memorandum Decision granting the 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and pursuant thereto the 
court having directed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Case NO~L2LC£LC.1^ 
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be made and entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant, which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law have 
been so made and entered and duly signed by the above-entitled 
court. 
NOW, THEREFORE, and pursuant thereto it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That a judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant for the life insurance proceeds that have 
previously been paid to the defendant on the life of Marlon 
Cutler, which life insurance proceeds are as follows: 
(a) Gem Insurance Company in the amount of $43,000.00. 
(b) Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company in 
the amount of $13,758.62. 
2. The life insurance proceeds that have been placed in an 
interest bearing bank account and are being held in a 
constructive trust and not to be withdrawn except upon further 
order of this court are hereby ordered to be delivered to the 
plaintiff immediately and said amount to be applied to the above 
judgment. 
3. That the home and real property that has been acquired 
by the defendant and which is located in Box Elder County, Utah 
and more particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
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Lot 3, Block 9, Plat A, Tremonton Townsite Survey. 
Together with all rights belonging thereto, 
which is being held in a constructive trust pursuant to an Order 
on Order to Show Cause on the express conditions that the home is 
to remain free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and no 
lien or encumbrance is to be placed upon said property until the 
further Order of this court, shall remain in said constructive 
trust and the express conditions contained therein that the home 
remain free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and no lien 
or encumbrance be placed against said property, are to continue 
in full force and effect. The defendant is given ten (10) days 
from the entry of judgment within which to pay the entire 
proceeds of $43,000.00 to the plaintiff. In the event said sum 
is not paid within said ten day period, the plaintiff shall be 
entitled to either obtain an Execution or to proceed without an 
Execution to have said home sold, with the defendant to execute 
the necessary documents to complete the sale and the proceeds of 
sale shall be applied to the judgment hereinabove set forth. 
4. That interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum 
shall be paid on said insurance proceeds from the date said 
insurance proceeds were received by the defendant (which dates 
would have been on or before January 28, 1992, on the $43,000.00 
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and on or about February 27, 1992, on the $13,758.62) until date 
of judgment and at the rate of twelve (12%) percent per annum 
from date of judgment until paid. 
DATED this <H day of IfecembgrJ, 1992^ . 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
-DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within Judgment and Order this / / day of December, 1992, 
to the defendant's attorney, Quinn D. Hunsaker, Molgard and 
Hunsaker, 102 South 1st West, P. 0. Box 461, Brigham City, Utah 
84302 and to Linda Cutler, 40 East 100 North, Tremonton, Utah 
84337 (Attorney Quinn Hunsaker having filed a Notice of 
Withdrawal of Counsel dated December 8, 1992). 
L-^sz=^ y ^ ^ T „ 
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Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #1289 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAY S. CUTLER by and through 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER, his 
Guardian, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LINDA CUTLER, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
Civil No. 920000013CV 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and 
Order entered by this court on January 5, 1993 shall remain in 
full force and effect except that paragraphs 8, 11 and 12 of said 
Findings shall be amended to read as follows: 
"8. The Affidavits of Mr. Thomas L. Willmore and 
Mary Ellen Cutler with accompanying attachments 
indicate that the deceased read and discussed the 
contents, terms and provisions of not only the 
Stipulation but likewise the Findings. As to that 
aspect, the court finds that the deceased was bound by 
the terms and provisions of the Stipulation which Jje fix/YYPc)^''^ 
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obviously read and signed and by the Findings just as 
if the provisions were found in the Decree. 
11. Neither the Gem State insurance policy for 
$43,000.00 nor the Provident Life and Accident 
insurance policy for $13,758.62 were specifically 
referred to in the notes of Attorney Thomas Willmore. 
Both policies were, however, provided by the State and 
the notes of Thomas Willmore stated: "Life 
insurance - - both will maintain for benefit of 
Clay - - Mary Ellen's with Thiokol - - Marlon's with 
State." At the time of the Divorce Decree (August 21, 
1989), the primary beneficiary of the $43,000.00 Gem 
State insurance policy was Mardi Ann Cutler, the 
decedent's daughter, who was over the age of majority. 
The decedent's minor son, Clay S. Cutler, was the 
secondary beneficiary. The named beneficiary at the 
time of the Divorce Decree on the $13,758.62 Provident 
Life and Accident insurance policy was the decedent's 
mother, Beth Cutler, and his minor son, Clay S. Cutler, 
was the secondary or alternate beneficiary. 
12. The court finds that on or about November 22, 
1989 the decedent changed the named beneficiary on the 
Provident Life and Accident insurance policy from 
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decedent's mother to his adult daughter, Mardi Ann 
Cutler, and his minor son, Clay S. Cutler, as co-
beneficiaries. In July of 1990 decedent changed the 
Provident Life and Accident insurance in the sum of 
$13,758.62 to his second wife, Linda Cutler, as primary 
beneficiary and his minor son, Clay Cutler, as 
secondary beneficiary. At the time of the divorce 
Mardi Ann Cutler was the named beneficiary of the 
$43,000.00 Gem State term insurance policy while the 
decedent's minor son, Clay S. Cutler was a secondary 
beneficiary. In July of 1990 the decedent changed the 
beneficiary on the Gem State insurance policy in the 
sum of $43,000.00 to his second wife, Linda Cutler, as 
primary beneficiary while his minor son, Clay S. 
Cutler, remained as secondary beneficiary. 
DATED this ^ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVEI 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within Amended Findings of Fact this gr-u, day of March, 
1993, to the defendant's attorneys, Findley P. Gridley and 
Christopher L. Shaw, Gridley, Ward, Hamilton & Shaw, 635 25th 
Street, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
tr/11 .-cutler, afd 
"—SECRETARY 
4 
TabH 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS T.. WTT.T.MnWK - 'll 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Box Elder ) 
THOMAS L. WILLMORE, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah. 
2. That in July and August, 1989, I was contacted and 
retained by Mary Ellen Cutler regarding a divorce action she wanted 
to file against her husband, Marlon Cutler. 
3. I was first contacted by Mrs. Cutler on July 6, 1989. She 
came to my office and I met with her. 
4. I had another conference with Mrs. Cutler on July 7, 1989 
in which I discussed with her the issues involved in a divorce 
action. 
5. One of the issues that I discussed with Mrs. Cutler was 
her life insurance and Mr. Cutler's life insurance being maintained 
for the benefit of their minor child, Clay Cutler. My notes of 
July 7, 1989 indicate as follows: "Life insurance—both will 
maintain for benefit of Clay—Mary Ellen's with Thiokol—Marlon's 
with State." 
6. This is the only reference in my notes concerning life 
insurance and it is my recollection that I discussed with Mrs. 
Cutler that the life insurance of both Mr. and Mrs. Cutler would be 
maintained for the benefit of their minor child, Clay Cutler. 
7. All information that I received for this divorce action 
was from Mrs. Cutler. I did not receive any information from Mr. 
Cutler and I did not have any discussions or negotiations with Mr. 
Cutler or anyone representing him. 
8. On August 14, 1989, I received a telephone message from 
Mrs. Cutler asking that I proceed to have the divorce action filed 
and set for a default hearing. After I spoke with her, I prepared 
a Stipulation incorporating the information she had provided to me. 
9. I reviewed the Stipulation with Mrs. Cutler in detail and 
she was in agreement with all of the provisions set forth in the 
Stipulation.
 c ^  v 42&ZL¥
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10. Mrs. Cutler appeared in my office and signed the 
Stipulation on August 14, 1989 in front of my secretary, Leslie 
Morrison, who is a Notary Public. 
11. Mr. Cutler appeared in my office and signed the 
Stipulation, Promissory Note and Trust Deed on August 15, 1989 in 
front of my secretary, Marie Riggs, who is Notary Public. 
12. A default divorce hearing was held on August 21, 1989 
before the Honorable F. L. Gunnell. On that date, Judge Gunnell 
signed and entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce. 
13. On August 21, 1989, I prepared a letter addressed to Mr. 
Cutler at 607 South Tremont Street, Tremonton, Utah 84337, and 
mailed the letter together with copies of the Decree of Divorce, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order to Withhold and 
Deliver. I indicated in my letter to him that the divorce was 
heard on August 21, 1989 and that if he had any questions or 
problems concerning the documents that he needed to contact his 
attorney immediately. A copy of my August 21, 1989 letter is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
14. Further the Affiant sayeth not. 
A' 
Thomas L. Willmore 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of October, 
1992. 
h M^~( 
NOTARY PUBL] 
Residing at: *£r6monton, Utah 
Commission Expires: 11-22-92 
cutlr)tlw.aff/tlw 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that c > n the ' / day of October, 1992 I 
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the within Affidavit of 
Thomas L. Willmore to the defendant's attorney, Quinn D. Hunsaker 
at Molgard & Hunsaker, P. 0. Box 4£l-> Brigham City, Utah 84301. 
(.L/'/dj./^ 
REED W. HADFIELD 
// 
EXHIBIT "Aff 
O L S O N & H O G G A N 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
L BRENT HOGGAN 
MILES P JENSEN 
BRUCE L. JORGENSEN 
BRAD H. BEARNSON P C 
THOMAS L. WILLMORE 
MARLIN J. GRANT 
OF COUNSEL 
WILLIAM L FILLMORE 
CHARLES P. OLSON (19161975) 
Augus t 2 1 , 1989 
56 WEST CENTER 
P.O BOX 525 
LOGAN. UTAH 64321 
TELEPHONE (601) 752-1551 
TELEFAX (601) 753-2699 
TREMONTON OFFICE 
123 EAST MAIN 
P.O. BOX 115 
TREMONTON. UTAH 64337 
TELEPHONE (601) 257-3665 
Marlon Cutler 
607 South Tremont 
Tremonton, Utah 84 33 7 
Re: Cutler vs. Cutler 
Our File No. T-1165 
Dear Mr. Cutler: 
Enclosed you will find conformed copies of the following 
documents: Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law & Order to Withhold and Deliver. The divorce was heard on 
August 21, 1989, and Judge Gunnell signed these documents. Please 
review these documents, and if you have any questions or problems 
with them you need to contact your attorney immediately. 
Sincerely, 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Thomas L. Willmore 
TLW/lm 
encs 
cutler.ltr/T1 
Tabl 
b i , . - .... >-•. 
I j i i ^  ' < -
Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #1289 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84! i? -nniu 
Telephone: 723-3404 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAY S. CUTLER, by and 
through MARY ELLEN CUTLER, 
his Guardian, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LINDA CUTLER, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
) 
Mary Ellen Cutler nka Mary Ellen Butler being first duly 
sworn deposes and says: 
1. r 
appointed guardian ad litem of Cla; Cutler, who is the 
plaintiff in the above-entitled action. 
?_ Prior to contacting Attorney Thomas I "! li llmore iv 
July of 1989, Marlon Cutler and myself discussed obtaining a 
OH 1 y 1992 „ 
• p, Jll/ -fa M,t 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY ELLEN 
CUTLER nka MARY ELLEN 
BUTLER 
CJ u i ] No, 920000013CV 
Property Settlement Agreement. It was decided at that time that 
both parties would keep in effect all of their present life 
insurance policies for the benefit of the minor child, Clay S. 
Cutler. Various other terms and conditions were agreed upon. On 
or about July 6th or 7th, 1989 I contacted Attorney Thomas L. 
Willmore concerning obtaining a divorce for me from my husband, 
Marlon Cutler. 
3. In my discussions with Attorney Willmore I advised him 
as to the things we had agreed upon, including the fact that each 
of us were to maintain our present life insurance policies, which 
life insurance policies were to be maintained for the benefit of 
our only minor child, Clay S. Cutler. Attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A" is a copy of a letter to Marlon Cutler from the Utah State 
Retirement Board dated July 21, 1989. This letter was during the 
time the Property Settlement Agreement was being worked out and 
was prior to Marlon's signing the Stipulation on August 15, 1989. 
4. Marlon and I had several discussions concerning what 
would be in the best interests of Clay and what Marlon felt would 
be fair to him financially. 
5. We both agreed to maintain medical and dental insurance 
on Clay. We both agreed to maintain our present life insurance 
policies for the benefit of Clay. Our discussions were 
specifically that each of us would maintain for the benefit of 
Clay all life insurance policies that each of us had in effect at 
that time. (See copy of Attorney Thomas L. Willmorefs notes 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). 
2 
6.
 a g r e e c , a c c e p t $2 6 less a month from what was 
calculated on the Child Support Obligation Worksheet (see copy of 
worksheet attached hereto as Exh ib i t < ) Il lu i l l i if ririroi'Ml ho 
not require any alimony and we both agreed that each would retain 
retirement benefits even though his retirement benefits 
were grea 
— -nd conditions of our stipulation were 
negotiated and agreed between 1 is and various adjustments and 
:1 i :: f ' is I:: :: the other in arriving at 
of the terms and conditions of said stipulation. 
The entire stipulation was a "qi-ve ind taki!i1 *] rrangement 
I: le par I: • : >f 1: < : t: 1 parties and the stipulation that was finally 
signed represented the final agreement after of the terms and 
conditions had been worked c »• i t 
9. I had carefully considered all r* the terms and 
conditions of the stipulation,. had Marlon, and firmly believed 
i | 11 mi mi i mi i i i M i i , i in 11 mi The 
life insurance was an important provision for me as I was most 
concerned about the welfare s. Cutler. 
ill11'"!!! I t" III III Ml , II III II i - l i l t . , b d y e t 
DATED this / 7 clay of October, 1992. 
MARY ELI&N CUTLER nka 
MARY EELEN BUTLER 
3 
It 
On the /V day of October, 1992 personally appeared before 
me Mary Ellen Cutler nka Mary Ellen Butler, the signer of the 
within instrument who duly acknowledged to me that she executed 
the same. -. 
& 
\ NOTARY PUBUC 
S ^ REEDW.HADFIELD 
* SSNorthMaln 
Irigham City, (Jtan 
St&cfUtah 
t My Comm. Expires 1/B/M 
*v tr/1:cutler.aff v*SSSSSSSSSS£~ - I 
< * 
I 
'/<>J\ rd../fo// 
NOTARY PUBLIC/ 
Residing at Brigham City, Utah 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
71 
tereby certify that 01 i the /' / claj of October, 1992 I 
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the within Affidavit of 
Mary Ellen Cutler kna Mary Ellen Butler to the defendant's 
attorney, Quinn D. Hunsaker at Molgard & Hunsaker, P. 0. Box 461, 
Brigham City, Utah 84301. 
L/sU $. W/JJJIJ/ 
REEDWTHADFIELD 
PUBUC EMPLOYEES GROUP INSURANCE 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
230 South 500 East. Suite 260 EXHIBIT "A" 
Salt Lake City.UT 84102 
(801)363-2002 
BERTD.HUNSAKER 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
July 21, 1989 
Marlon S. Cutler 
607 South Tremont 
Tremonton, UT 84337 
Dear Insured: 
In checking our life insurance records, it has been determined that you 
do not have an enrollment card in file for the Gem Life Insurance. It 
is essential that a current enrollment card with your beneficiary is in 
our office for you. 
Payroll records show you have the basic $18,000 provided by the State, 
additional term in the amount of $25,000 for a total of $43,000 
You do do not X have dependent coverage. 
Return the completed card to the above address no later than 8/4/89 
REMEMBER IT IS ESSENTIAL YOU COMPLETE THIS CARD AS ALL STATE EMPLOYEES 
HAVE LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS. Be sure to mark all information. 
Thank you for your cooperation, 
Kathleen Anderson 
Life and Accident Benefits Manager 
Note: If possible please obtain a new card from your payroll clerk. 
r jAX l -LJDJ .T \ D (SJ 
THOMAS L. WILLMORE'S NOTES 
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EXHIBIT "CM 
IN THE F I R S T DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY ELLEN CUTLER 
vs. 
MARLON CUTLER 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY) 
C i v i l No. 
BASE AWAUD CALCULATION 
j Mother | Father j Combir 
}1. Enter the number of children of this mother and !///////////!///////////! 
j father for whom support is to be awarded. !///////////!///////////! 1 
|2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income.JS |$ !/////// 
! Refer to Instructions for definition of income. 11875 ! 1670 !/////// 
|2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually |- |- j/////// 
| paid. (Do not enter alimony ordered for this case). ! 0 ! 0 !/////// 
|2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enterj- j- !/////// 
} payments ordered for the child(ren) in this case). ! 0 ! 0 !/////// 
!2d. For modification and paternity actions only: Enter j j Mil, III 
J the amount from Line 12 of the Present Family j- |- Mil III1 
! Worksheet for the non-custodial parent. 1 0 ! 0 MilIII1 
jj. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the j§ j$ j$ 
| Ad-justed Monthly Gross for child support purposes. } 1875 ! 1670 ! 3545 
|4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of Ml Hill III/ Ml II III! Ill !$ 
! children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the M1111111111 \f 1111111III \ 
j Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. M1I1II111IIMII1111111I\ 
j5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3| { MlIIIII 
\ by the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. ! 53 %! 47 %!/////// 
|6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain |$ |$ Mill III 
\ each parent's share of the Base Support Obligation. | 19 9! 176 Mil fill 
|7. Enter the child(ren)'s portion of monthly medical and!- |- Mill III 
| dental insurance premiums paid to insurance company, j Q ! _ __Q !/////// 
J8. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
! Subtract Line 7 from Line 6 for the Obligor parent. 
i Page 2 for Extraordinary Medical and Child Care Expenses. 
Continue to !$ 176 
|9. BASE AMOUNT PER CHILD 
! Divide Line 8 by Line 1, 
176 
EXTENDED VISITATION 
The BASE AMOUNT PER CHILD (Line 9) will he reduced by 5'0% for each child for time periods 
dtuinq which specific extended visitation of that child with the non-custodial parent is 
uranted in the order for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. 
YTINUOUS EXTRAORDINARY MEDICAL RXPENSES/Sole Custody 
J_ Mother Father ! Combined 
)a. Enter the child(ren)'s monthly uninsured continuous \///////////\///////////\$ 
extraordinary medical, expenses to be ordered, (if !///////////!///////////I 
none, enter zero in Line 11 and go to Line 12a). }///////////!///////////! 0 
)b. Multiply the figure in Line 10a by .50 to determine j$ 
each parent's share of the medical expense. [_ 
:$ 
JL JL 
!///////// 
!///////// 
11. AMOUNT TO BE ADDED TO THE BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD FOR CONTIN-
UOUS EXTRAORDINARY MEDICAL EXPENSES (Enter Line 10b for the 
Obligor parent. Do not include past extraordinary medical 
expenses here. Past expenses should be treated as a separate 
judgment in the order. _ _ _____ « 
LD CARE EXPENSES 
CHILD CARE COMPUTATION 
For WORK RELATED CHILD CARE COSTS (Adjudicator may consider Training Related'Child 
Care). If none are claimedr enter zero in #13 and go to #14. 
a. Enter the full monthly child care payment to be paid to the 
provider. 0 
b. Multiply Line 12a by the number of months the chi 1 d(rei i) are i n 
child care during one year. 
CHILD CARE TAX CREDIT COMPUTATION 
Multiply the custodial parent's gross monthly income from Line 2a on |$ 
Page 1 by 12 to obtain gross annual Income. |_ 
d. Take Line 12c to Child Care Tax Table in Instructions. Find the ap 
propriate percentage for the federal tax credit. Enter it here. 
The maximum monthly child care payment allowed for the tax credit 
is $200 for 1 child or $400 for 2 or more children. Enter the 
actual monthly amount paidf up to the maximum allowed. ___ 
15 
Multiply Line 12e by the number of months the child(ren) are in |$ 
child care during one year.
 m .„_._..._„. ..„_..,„ ,,____ _ _ , ,,1 
j. Multiply Line 12d by Line 12f. 
Tax Credit. 
Till!;* Is the amount of the Child Care ! S 
l. Subtract Line 12g from Line 12b to obtain the annual child care 
amount paid after the child care tax credit. 
!$ 
Divide Line 12h by the number of months the child(ren) are in care !$ 
during one year.
 | I 
|13. AMOUNT TO BE ADDED TO THE BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
! FOR CHILD CARE Multiply Line 12i by .50. This amount is owed 
i only when child care costs are actually incurred. 
!$ 
!14. TOTAL MONTHLY CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
! Add Lines n ^ --**-* IS 176 
Page 2 
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(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case .or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
